ered by Barbeyrac as Rector of the Académie de Lausanne in 1715, and a Discours sur le bénéfice des loix, delivered in the same office in 1716. The 1716 edition of The Whole Duty of Man could not of course have incorporated these components of Barbeyrac's 1718 edition. But now, three centuries later, Anglophone readers can access an important avenue into political disputes and religious conflicts still tearing early eighteenth-century Protestantism.
Three thresholds of adjustment mark these French and English versions of the De officio: 11 Barbeyrac's 1707 French translation bridging the reception context of Pufendorf's Latin original and the Huguenot translator's vernacular readership; Tooke's 1691 rendering of the De officio into English for a non-Latinate readership and, in the 1716 edition, the editors' further adjustment of the English text in light of Barbeyrac's 1707 translation and notes; and Barbeyrac's 1718 translation of and response to Leibniz's divine-rational critique of Pufendorf's politically grounded natural jurisprudence.
Historically speaking, natural law was a preeminent presence in early modern intellectual life. It lay at the epicenter of profound disputes over the right boundaries to be drawn between church and state, and especially over any move to grant the political state a secular legitimacy. Given the diverse religious-political trajectories of different Western European territories and the violently contested concept of state sovereignty, early modern natural law was not a unified phenomenon of culture. Its doctrines could not help but be adjusted and readjusted in accordance with conflicts fought and settlements achieved in this or that theatre of religious dissension and political struggle. These adjustments and readjustments are manifest in vernacular translations of Latin natural-law writings that played a significant part in cosmopolitan interactions in the early 1700s.
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BARBEYRAC'S ROLE IN THE ENGLISH RECEPTION OF PUFENDORF'S DE OFFICIO
Between the first publication of Tooke's English translation of the De officio in 1691 and the appearance in 1716 of the fourth edition of The Whole Duty of Man with its borrowings from Barbeyrac, Louis XIV died. This death in 1715 no doubt gave pause, whether to those who still hoped for or to those who had long feared a universal Catholicization of Europe led by the imperial French king. English politics in the 1690s remained in uncertain balance between William III's insistence on the fiscal and military prerogatives necessary to wage a defensive Protestant war against the French and Parliament's claim to the status of an independent sovereign legislature. 13 Into this context Tooke's translation imported Pufendorf's absolutist natural jurisprudence, originally deployed to legitimate Protestant territorial states engaged in a struggle for hegemony against Catholic Empire and local estates. To English readers for whom absolutism-and its associated raison d'état thinking-was an alien political form, the German jurist's "Bodinian" lexicon of civitas ("state") and summum imperium ("sovereignty") could scarcely enter English usage without adjustment.
For Tooke the lexical strategy was circumlocution. The De officio's twentieth-century English translator, Michael Silverthorne, recognizes that Tooke's reluctance to employ "state" for civitas in the Pufendorfian sense of an indepen-dent sovereign dominion manifested itself in a variety of alternative terms, including "society," "civil society," "commonwealth," "community," and "nation." 14 In the English political lexicon at the turn of the eighteenth century, however, as Silverthorne's version underscores the difference: "Only when they have achieved a union of wills and forces is a multitude of men brought to life as a corporate body stronger than any other body, namely a state [civitas] ." 18 Tooke, it seems, adapted Pufendorf to express a distinctively English sensibility to the then current political weight of "state." Yet at least one of his preferences coincided with Barbeyrac's alternative rendering of civitas as "société civile" which-as "civil society"-could pass more easily into English circulation than "state." 19 Unlike the anonymous editors of the 1716 edition of The Whole Duty of Man, as translator of the De officio Tooke had no access to Barbeyrac's 1707 French version. This was not the case of his English contemporary, Basil Kennet, the translator of the De jure. As we shall see, for his 1717 edition of The Law of Nature and Nations Kennet could draw on Barbeyrac's 1706 French translation, Le droit de la nature et des gens, and its footnote commentary. 20 Kennet's lexical choices are mostly similar to Tooke's, however, as evidenced in the chapter "Of the Causes and Motives inducing Men to establish civil Societies," where Kennet confronts a veritable compendium of key political terms:
For the clearing up of this whole Matter, we ought to consider, what that Condition is which Men enter into, upon their erecting a civil State; what Qualities they are which may entitle them to the Name of political Creatures; and lastly, what there is in their Frame and Constitution which seems (if we may so speak) to indispose them for a Civil Life. First then, whoever enters into a Community, divests himself of his natural Freedom, and puts himself under Government, which, amongst other Things, comprehends the Power of Life and Death over him, together with Authority to enjoin him some Things to which he has an utter Aversion, and to prohibit others, for which he may have as strong an Inclination. 21 Here Kennet's "civil State" renders Pufendorf's unadorned civitas. Next, Kennet deletes the phrase "that is, good citizen" (i. e. bonus civis) with which Pufendorf qualifies "political creatures" (animal politicum), the jurist's statist gloss designed to undercut the metaphysical naturalism of Aristotle's concept of zoon politikon.
For Pufendorf, the good citizen is an adventitious creation of civil discipline, not the inevitable realization of a moral nature. In Kennet's second sentence, the English text tells of entering a "Community" and accepting its "Government." By contrast, in Pufendorf it is entrance to the state that is at issue, a political event that entails subjection to command or sovereignty (Civitatem qui subit . . . imperio se subjicit).
More easily than the English versions, Barbeyrac's French translation of the De officio allows the state supremacy as the most powerful of all social bodies. In fact, he offers an explicit justification for his usage of "Etat" at the opening of the fifth chapter of Book II, "Des motifs qui ont porté les Hommes à former des Sociétés Civiles." The topic is how men, in exiting from the "petites Sociétéz" or small associations of the state of nature, "then formed political bodies, or civil societies, to which we give the name of State." 22 Barbeyrac's footnote glosses "Etat" in the following terms:
Civitas, says our Author [Pufendorf] , and this is good Latin: but our French word Cité, which is cognate, is no longer used in this sense. There is no suggestion here that the translation of civitas by "Etat" was a neologism in need of justification or an eccentricity in need of excuse. 24 Yet, for Barbeyrac, a crucial normative issue remains: the relation of the state's exercise of political supremacy to the prerogatives of the individual conscience. For Pufendorf, the domain of conscience should not extend into government of the civil sphere. This follows from his more Hobbesian view of conscience as always a judgment in accordance with a law (which may be the law of God). What is unacceptable-because it had proven so inimical to peaceful coexistence among the rival confessions-is an exercise of civil judgment on the basis of an inner insight. This can only spread tumult, given the now irreducible conflict of confessional beliefs. In respect to this crucial issue, however, Barbeyrac was not unlike Tooke in moderating the "statist" dimensions of Pufendorf's writings, but with a Huguenot's view to regrounding natural law explicitly in an inviolable right of conscience. 25 If Barbeyrac insisted on the moral wrong-and practical futility-of using the secular sword to force the individual conscience, this was to defend man's access via conscience to the irresistible moral laws written in the heart by God. Footnote commentary underscored this Lockean stance.
Principled commitment to freedom of conscience might seem necessarily to comport religious toleration. Yet the confessional wars of massacre, fought not for land but for purity of faith and cleansing away of heretics, had shown over and again that a defense of conscience was not simply synonymous with a rejection of violence. Viewed in this light, Pufendorfian statism was arguably a more "tolerant" politics for the task of managing the now permanent fact of religious pluralism, not least to the extent that such a politics envisaged a civil sovereign exempted from judging issues of theological truth (or error). 26 
PUFENDORF, LEIBNIZ, BARBEYRAC
Between Leibniz and Pufendorf no love was lost. As Leibniz famously wrote to Kästner in 1709, he considered the jurist parum jurisconsultus et minime philosophus, "an inadequate lawyer and a worse philosopher." His monita or "warning" against Pufendorf's principles of natural law was no less famous.
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Reviewing the metaphysical philosopher's confrontation with Pufendorf's new political jurisprudence, Norberto Bobbio identifies their confrontation with the conceptual clash of rationalism and voluntarism. 28 But the discord between the "philosopher-jurist" (Leibniz) and the "jurist-philosopher" (Pufendorf) was far more consequential than a purely intellectual exchange. It was, writes Bobbio, the confrontation of a "theological" and a "secular and worldly" conception of law, marking a decisive cleavage between old and new. 29 At this historical divide between theology and jurisprudence, the two fundamental ways of addressing legal philosophy found their two great representatives in Leibniz and Pufendorf. The political jurist stipulated a limit to natural law at the very threshold where the metaphysical philosopher claimed insight into the transcendent moral reason that alone could guide-and judge-the civil laws. 30 The political stakes were very high. Did civil laws continue in a state of debility until informed by the universal moral norms of natural law secundum disciplinam Christianorum, "according to the teaching of the Christians"? Were clerical powers and Christian morality always to superintend state sovereignty and political authority?
In publishing Leibniz's anti-Pufendorf warning in 1718, Barbeyrac in no way offers a thoroughgoing "defense" of the political jurist. In fact he jeopardizes Pufendorf's intellectual strategy of legitimating an absolutist state that would not subordinate civil authority to confessional ends. True, Barbeyrac also takes his distance from Leibniz, where the latter reasserts the traditional nexus of natural law and metaphysics and thus reserves a role for theologico-rational superintendence over individual consciences. As a Huguenot facing Louis XIV's state program of Catholic reconformity, Barbeyrac can contemplate what Leibniz could not: the separation of religion and church from law and state. Conversely, Pufendorf's detheologized natural law might ground a secularized civil authority but it did not secure the moral value most prized in the Huguenot perspective: an inviolable right of conscience. 31 By reimplanting the primacy of conscience, Barbeyrac reimplants natural law in moral theology.
But in such a complex matter there is more to say. Leibniz, as noted, set transcendent moral reason above Pufendorf's worldly natural law, and universal justice above the civil justice of a human tribunal whose end was mere security. Here Barbeyrac surely paused. What if an "unreasonable" moral reason were endorsed and enforced by a civil authority-in the name of religious conformity and political unity-such that dissenters were constrained, on pain of sanction, to go against their conscientious belief? The dilemma confronting Barbeyrac would have given point to the exclusion of inner states-mental, moral or spiritualfrom the jurisdiction of natural law that Pufendorf envisages in the De officio:
[A]s human jurisdiction is concerned only with a man's external actions and does not penetrate to what is hidden in the heart and which gives no external effect or sign, and consequently takes no account of it, natural law too is largely concerned with forming men's external actions. 32 Confinement of natural law to the forming of "external actions" appals Leibniz. He counters Pufendorf's withdrawal of natural law from the inner life with the expansive claim that "in a universal society governed by God every virtue, as has already been said many times, is comprehended among the obligations of universal justice; and not only external acts, but also all of our sentiments are regulated by a certain rule of law." 33 Correctly, Leibniz recognizes that Pufendorf's demarcation between external actions and "what is hidden in the heart" signifies the emergence of a juridical regime over which moral theologians-and metaphysical philosophers-would have no say. This prospect provokes the charge that the author of the De officio would remove "Christian philosophers," those essential masters of the inner life, from the domain of natural law. Absent the "Christian philosophers," Leibniz threatens, natural law would be disconnected from the "eternal truths" of "universal jurisprudence" with whose transcendent standard all law, human and divine, must comply if it is to be legitimate. The applicable maxim is "that not everything should be measured by the goods of this life." 34 Leibniz can only refuse Pufendorf's further argument that-regardless of their inner state of moral good or spiritual grace-men can meet the demands of a civil ethics provided they conduct themselves in a manner that conforms externally to the rules of worldly sociability. Leibniz, by contrast, believed that heretical belief could be punished as a crime. 35 Inner states were perfectly justiciable.
Between Leibniz and Pufendorf, Barbeyrac is ambivalent. He endorses Leibniz's extending of natural law to embrace matters of the inner life. Individual conscience is thus the true adjudicator of external acts because, alone, it offers unmediated access to the will of God. Implausibly, Barbeyrac would have us believe that Pufendorf too maintains the binding force of conscience as the nexus between external acts and inner states, the link between law and eternity. 36 But Barbeyrac knew what had happened in France, when an all-powerful civil authority acted to enforce its version of eternity.
37 Against Leibniz, he could therefore endorse Pufendorf's conception of the inner sphere as out-of-bounds to civil intervention, agreeing that obligations under natural law apply only to those external acts that others are entitled to expect of us:
Once one has done [by way of external action] . . . all that one was required to do, whether the internal act was as vicious as you please, nobody can ask any more of us, nor, finally, must they do so, even though the internal principle of the action by which one has acquitted oneself of what was required had something about it that the divine tribunal and our own conscience would condemn. 38 This concession aside, for Barbeyrac it is not the civil sovereign but the inviolable rights of the individual conscience that delimit the reach of political authority. But this is to reinstate the very threat that Pufendorf was seeking to exclude.
For the jurist, we recall, to allow the rule of conscience to preempt the authority of civil government was to renew the risk of social disruption and religious war. If individuals believed that their own moral views entitle them to judge the civil sovereign's lawful command, they would also believe that subversion was justified. As to this threat Pufendorf is crystal-clear-to subordinate law to conscience and political authority to inner insight is to return to social instability: "[I]f one wishes to ascribe to the practical judgment or conscience some particu-lar power to direct actions, which does not emanate or arise from law, he ascribes the power of laws to any fantastic idea of men, and introduces the utmost confusion into human affairs." Therefore, observes Pufendorf, "a place is allowed the conscience in directing the actions of man, only in respect that it can take cognizance of laws." 39 Is Barbeyrac incoherent in seeking to realign law with conscience while seeking to avoid enforcement of conscience by the law? If there is incoherence, it may be less a fault of logic than testimony to the historical circumstances of the Huguenots, a people with a binding religion but without a political state. Whatever, in the face of Leibniz's critique, Barbeyrac's "defense" of Pufendorf is rather a matter of serial adjustments that would transform the latter's natural jurisprudence towards a Huguenot perspective. 40 The impulses driving this transformation surface in a footnote-essay in which Barbeyrac takes his distance from Pufendorf's argument in the De jure that the political state originates in men's fear of mutual predation, rather than in their desire for sociability or need for moral completion. These are issues of fundamental political conception rather than of simple lexicon, issues whose explication goes beyond referral to a Huguenot response to circumstance. To throw doubt on Pufendorf's singular "original" of the political state, Barbeyrac assembles philosophical and biblical accounts of the origins of sovereignty, with particular emphasis on a gradual historical emergence of political rights from agreements, treaties and compacts. Throughout, Barbeyrac speaks not of sovereignty and the state, but of government and civil society. The political point of this language is made explicit in one of his multiple references to Locke:
Mr. Locke has, likewise, treated of the Origin of civil societies in his second Treatise of civil Government, Ch. vii, &c. As for the Rest, all I have said here in this Note, upon the different Motives which gave Birth to civil society, does not exclude Conventions either express or tacit. These must always be supposed to intervene here to found the Authority of those who command, and the Obligation of those who obey; as well as to regulate the respective limits of Power and Subjection. 41 Barbeyrac thus cites a Lockean account of the governed and their governors reaching mutual agreement over the respective limits of obedience and authority. This is wholly at odds with Pufendorf's Hobbesian account of men, driven by mutual fear, appointing a sovereign who in fulfilling his civil duties is accountable to no one. Instead, the Lockean rationale of civil authority constrained by natural rights and consensual agreements was Barbeyrac's preferred resolution of the otherwise irresolvable clash of perspectives between Pufendorf's secularization of the state in the name of worldly peace and public security, and Leibniz's counter-propoposition: a resacralization of the state in the name of divine harmony and rationalmoral perfection.
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TWO DISCOURSES ON MORALITY AND THE CIVIL LAWS
Pufendorf composed the De officio as the textbook for students of his new natural jurisprudence. It was designed to be the instrument that would allow them to attune themselves-politically and professionally, ethically and personal-ly-to the common rules of duty in a post-Westphalian security state. The civil education of the young was a priority also for Barbeyrac, who included as appendices in the 1718 edition of Les devoirs de l'homme et du citoien two of his own "academic discourses." These were formal end-of-year orations, delivered in French as Rector of the Académie de Lausanne to which he had been appointed in 1710 to teach law and history: a Discours sur la permission des loix in 1715, followed a year later by a complementary Discours sur le bénéfice des loix.
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Both Discours expound the theme of a higher moral law as the normative platform from where one's own conduct and the provisions of the positive (or civil) laws must be assessed. The Rector left his audience-city officials, the academic community of teachers and students-in no doubt: strict laws and procedures are necessary but not sufficient. A subject's mere conformity to the laws is no guarantee of their goodness as a creature. He had been hired to say this sort of thing. The rules of law (règles du droit) might serve the civil courts but the precepts of right (préceptes du droit) serve all humanity before the court of conscience:
The civil laws and the laws of virtue thus form as it were two distinct jurisdictions, which may well converge up to a certain point, but beyond this point virtue alone remains, and commands absolutely. Or rather virtue is always the supreme mistress. 44 Positive laws (loix civiles) might constrain the external acts of men and thus ensure civil peace (repos de la société), but they can neither make men virtuous according to the laws of virtue (loix de la vertu) nor exonerate them from the duties imposed by God and "the natural empire that virtue holds over men." 45 Though contingent on time and place, the positive laws are not necessarily amiss. They might, if all is well, accord with the unchanging precepts of right. This partial concession aside, Barbeyrac's Discours scarcely constitute a Pufendorfian eulogy of civil authority in general, or of the civil laws-statute and custom-in particular. 46 Before receiving their prizes, the students were thus forced to confront a stark discrepancy between positive law and moral principle. In the Discours sur la permission des loix-now translated as "Discourse on what is permitted by the laws"-the discrepancy is thematized in Barbeyrac's subtitle: "Where it is shown that what is permitted by the laws is not always just and honest." 47 Adopting the aspirational mode of Christian-Stoic humanism and drawing on his immense treasury of classical and biblical citations, Roman and civil laws, travellers' tales and popular errors, the speaker told his audience that legality and public order are not enough, ever.
There are two lines of argument on actions that are "permitted"-not forbidden-by the civil laws: one, the permission d'impunité, regarding actions that can be undertaken with "impunity," because the civil laws are silent on the matter; the other, the permission d'approbation, regarding actions that can be undertaken with "innocence," because the moral law approves of them. For moral delicts there were penalties: the shame of failing to do all one could do to develop one's virtue for the moral good of "society," and the fear of appearing in this shameful condition before the heavenly tribunal of God. To persuade them to look beyond the mundane order of the civil laws to a moral future accessible through conscience and reflective moral reason, the students heard instance after instance where actions permitted by the civil laws contravened a moral law of nature, "these immutable laws, written in our hearts." 48 Having been reminded that their youth made them easy prey to passion, the students were given the predictable advice: even if you can do it legally, don't! The Discours sur le bénéfice des loix-now translated as "Discourse on the benefits conferred by the laws"-demonstrates "that in good conscience one cannot always take advantage of benefits conferred by the most explicit civil laws." 49 Barbeyrac again explained to his young listeners why the actions of a "good man" were, morally speaking, other than those of a merely law-abiding citizen. Thus " [t] here are laws the benefits of which we can always enjoy without doing harm to anyone, yet what strict justice then allows, some other virtue in certain cases forbids." 50 The civil laws cannot do everything, "[b]ut even regarding what lies within the ambit of the civil laws, things cannot always be regulated in the manner most conforming to the immutable laws of justice that apply to everything and everywhere." 51 Cicero-not Pufendorf-is cited in support: "The laws redress injustices in one way, but the philosophers correct them in another." 52 The argument and the multifarious examples demonstrate the moral gain in renouncing benefits conferred by laws that "are themselves most often just, but they do not embrace all that is just." 53 As a result, "one may act only in accordance with the laws and, notwithstanding this, still fall short in an infinity of things that true probity demands." 54 It is, in short, a matter of obeying "natural obligation," not civil command.
Despite being Pufendorf's now established French translator, Barbeyrac makes few references in the two Discours to the author of the De jure and the De officio. As published, the Permission des loix contains three such references in margin notes, two of which in fact refer to Barbeyrac's own notes in the Pufendorf translations. No less space is given to Le Clerc, Bayle, and Noodt. As for the Bénéfice des loix, there are references to Bodin, Grotius, Noodt, and Thomasius, but again just three to Pufendorf, one of which is self-referential to a note of Barbeyrac's. These bare statistics underscore a feature of the Discours: when speaking in his own voice, the translator makes little call on Pufendorf. If Pufendorf was the original, Barbeyrac was no transparent copy.
JEAN BARBEYRAC: MEDIATOR OR ADJUSTOR?
Through accumulated views of his writings, especially his Pufendorf translations and commentaries, Barbeyrac has come to be recognized as a mediator of opposed positions in early modern conflicts within natural jurisprudence. Historians of ideas place the great translator in the middle ground between the "voluntarism" of a Pufendorf and the "rationalism" of a Leibniz. 55 There is no gainsaying the acceptance of such philosophical categorisations. On the textual evidence, however, it would seem more accurate to characterize Barbeyrac as a serious adjustor of Pufendorf's radical retheorizing of natural law, not its mediator. This suggestion finds conceptual support in an important discussion of Barbeyrac's "anti-Hobbesian mentality," a mentality that marks the translator's political and juridical distance from the author. 56 In the face of the backlash against his Hobbesian reconceptualising of natural law as a secular ethics distinct from the concerns of moral theology, Pufendorf himself felt the need to adjust the De jure. His detheologizing of natural law made Pufendorf the favored target of the neoscholastic orthodox-Protestant as well as Catholic-for whom religion alone could be foundational for political sovereignty and civil law. Theologians accused him of profanity, impiety, and even heresy for having set apart what they bound together: natural law and moral theology, civil authority and clerical religion, state and church. So virulent was the criticism that in a second edition of the De jure, published in 1684, Pufendorf masked his civil radicalism by adding an anti-Hobbesian camouflage, though retaining almost everything that he had written in the first edition of 1672. The scholarly authority here is Fiammetta Palladini. Having presented "Pufendorf the Hobbesian" in the first part of her book, Palladini devotes the second part to answering the question: "Why did Pufendorf pass for anti-Hobbesian?" Her explanation hinges on reading the changes made by Pufendorf between the two editions as a ploy to mislead his theologian enemies with false clues as to his being a regular critic of Hobbes. The changes included an insertion of critical remarks on Hobbes and extensive references to Richard Cumberland, the English antiHobbes, for whom bene naturale and universal benevolentia were the foundations of natural law doctrine. Palladini does not mute her scholarly outrage: "What remains is [our] resentment at hearing this talk of a natural goodness, after all the effort to show that 'omnes motus et actiones hominis, remota omni lege tam divina quam humana sint indifferentes.'" 57 Or again: "There is more (and worse) to come" as Pufendorf's "great theorization of the ineliminable difference between nature and law" is blurred. The concepts imported into the second edition of the De jure, Palladini argues, act "like monstrous foreign bodies that attach themselves to the fabric of a doctrine fashioned, as we have seen, without them and, in fact, against them."
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Yet it was just this blurring of Pufendorf's distinction between nature and law, religious justification and political duty, that an anti-Hobbesian Barbeyrac promulgated through his translations. The point, of course, is not to charge Barbeyrac with inaccuracy as a translator. Technically speaking, he was not unreflective on the question of fidelity to originals. In a public oration delivered at Lausanne in 1714, the Discours sur l'utilité des lettres et des sciences, he commented on the status of Latin-the "common tongue of the learned everywhere"-and the usage of vernaculars:
And no one should think they can exonerate themselves by reading [vernacular] translations. These have their use: but they suffice only to encourage readers to strive to acquire that adequate degree of enlightenment [Latinity] to which every good man aspires who has the means to do so. 59 Not only do "Originals always lose much" in translation; they are "as if travestied in the hands of those who dress them in the fashion of their own nation." As for translations that have been published, There are few that are such as to allow one to count on the faithfulness and the accuracy of the translators, even with regard to histories, where everything is sacred, and the least alteration, the least slip, is of fatal consequence. After all, one is obliged to see with the eyes of another when one is obliged to have recourse to a translated version. 60 This "originalist" posture is struck again with regard to Barbeyrac's own "faithfulness and accuracy" where his translation of Leibniz's monita is concerned. Hence the provision in the text of the Jugement of selected citations from the metaphysician's Latin. As the translator indicates in a prefatory paragraph: "I shall attempt to express the anonymous writer's thoughts with the utmost exactitude; and I shall record in the margin, or in footnotes, the exact terms of his original, whenever I fear I might not have caught the sense, or for some other reason." 61 In fact, as argued here, Barbeyrac was an "activist" translator, a political adjustor of his source . . . when that source was Pufendorf. Appraising a lack in the latter, Barbeyrac translated Pufendorf out of a secular politics and into a foreordained horizon of individual conscience. This assessment is underscored if his editing and commentary are included in this work of adjustment. Not for nothing, in the prefatory remarks to his translation of the De jure, does Barbeyrac advise the reader that he has "rectified the ideas of the author" (although he does add "and my own"). Nor were the rectifications trivial. The distinction between "civil society" and "state of nature" is fundamental to Pufendorf's natural jurisprudence, marking the new threshold that protects civil institutions against religiously grounded derivations from or metaphysically grounded reductions to "nature."
62 Such protection is the conceptual guarantee of an institutional autonomy for politics and law.
63 For Barbeyrac, however, Pufendorf's praising of civil society, that is, of the political state under the rule of law, and his disparaging of life in the state of nature, are both excessive. At his most naturalist and anti-institutional, the translator here turns editor with a vengeance. In his French version of the De officio, he excises from the key opening chapter of Book II Pufendorf's unmistakably bleak account of life in the state of nature. 64 Later in the same chapter Barbeyrac repeats this editorial gesture, excising what Pufendorf had written on man's existence among the "inconveniences" of the natural state:
For if you form in your Mind the Idea of a Man even at his full Growth of Strength and Understanding, but without all those Assistances and Advantages by which the Wit of Man has rendered Human Life much more orderly and more easie than at the beginning; you shall have before you, a naked Creature, no better than dumb, wanting all Things, satisfying his Hunger with Roots and Herbs, slaking his Thirst with any Water he can find, avoiding the extremities of the Weather by creeping into Caves or the like, exposed an easie Prey to the ravenous Beasts, and trembling at the Sight of any of them. 65 Instead of commenting, Barbeyrac censors-so important was it to remove an image that showed existence in the state of nature as an existence to be abrogated.
Excisions that subtract basic elements of Pufendorf's natural jurisprudence are complemented by voluminous footnotes that add Barbeyrac's serial adjustments. In his glossing of the De jure, for instance, he intervenes with a sequence of ten critical footnotes, some of them explicitly anti-Hobbesian. 66 The The roseate image that Pufendorf had drawn of existence in the civil state was to be forfeit. Such critical notes, together with excisions and reorderings of the original text and lexical inflections in translation, make up the case: faced with Pufendorf's political and juridical principles, Barbeyrac was no mere mediator. Nor was he just a moderate adjustor of Pufendorf. On the evidence of these interventions, there was a more aggressive Barbeyrac. We see a moral philosopher assimilating the political jurist to his own position. We see a resacralized natural jurisprudence in which the political science of civil duties was rendered once again continuous with moral theology. To restore this continuity was Barbeyrac's reminder call: there was a moral law of God higher than the civil laws of states.
The effect of Barbeyrac's adjustments was to blunt the impact of a Pufendorf whose political thought is unequivocally statist. To individuals increasingly imbued with a Lockean quotient of natural rights and its attendant anti-statism, such thought was and will remain alien. 68 Whereas Barbeyrac now granted conscience the capacity to determine the limits of legitimate political authority, Pufendorf's scandalously civil natural jurisprudence had quarantined the civil duties of the citizen-subject from the religious obligations of the Christian. He had hoped in this way to keep confessional zeal from once again commandeering political authority and undermining civil security, as it had done in the years of religious civil war. The fact is clear: such a radically political jurisprudence as Pufendorf's can be adjusted in one direction only, a direction that returns politics to divine providence, and rejoins law to a religious-metaphysical grounding. 2. In confessional matters, Pufendorf was a Lutheran, Barbeyrac a Calvinist with Socinian leanings. In his later writings-such as the Jus feciale divinum sive de consensu et dissensu protestantium, posthumously published in 1695-Pufendorf envisaged a Protestant church unified by norms that, he hoped, would be acceptable both to Lutherans and Calvinists (though he remained close to mainstream Lutheranism and entirely excluded a predestinarian doctrine of election). As a diasporic Huguenot, Barbeyrac made the case for toleration of religious minorities in majoritarian confessional states. So too did Pufendorf, but on worldly grounds, whether as prudent politics on the part of a sovereign faced with the all-too-real problem of maintaining civil peace among rival confessions, or as a justified observance of the legal terms of the Peace of Westphalia. 12. While the present study concerns Barbeyrac's rendering of Pufendorf's Latin into French, with specific reference to the translation of the De officio, the following section comments on the role of Barbeyrac's Pufendorf in early modern English translations. One can speculate that Barbeyrac's "Lockeanized" Pufendorf gave the latter a certain purchase in Whig circles where the German jurist's separation of state from church could perhaps be used in defending constitutional liberties against encroachments by an Anglican church-state. However, a different research program would be needed to determine the precise extent to which, as translator of Latin natural-law writings for Francophone readers, Barbeyrac's choice of key terms in the political lexicon was idiosyncratic or in keeping with that of other French writers. The research could consider Barbeyrac's fellow Huguenot réfugiés-translators such as Jean Le Clerc and Pierre Coste, intellectual activists such as Pierre Bayle, and selftranslators, including from vernacular to Latin, such as Jean Bodin. 
